

# Emissions Trading

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# Outline

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- What is Cap-and-Trade?
- Some History and Pictures
- Allocation, Cost, and Electric Power Regulation



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## Two Types of Emissions Trading

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### **Credit Trading, or Baseline-and-Credit**

Credit for over-control of some specified standard  
usable to excuse under-control elsewhere

Trading in differences from pre-existing standard

### **Allowance Trading, or Cap-and-Trade**

Trading in limited “rights” from the “bottom up”

No prescribed standard for individual sources

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## Evolution of Emissions Trading

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- Credit Trading has evolved out of conventional regulation
    - Pre-existing standard (baseline) already in place
    - High transaction costs have limited use
  - Allowance Trading is radically different
    - Decentralized, property rights system
    - Emerged in the U.S. out of political stalemate
    - Far more successful than expected
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## Market Aspects of Credit and Allowance Trading

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### **Credit Trading $\approx$ Barter Economy**

“Market” is created for each transaction

Rules and terms of trade differ by transaction

Regulator typically approves each trade

### **Allowance Trading $\approx$ Market Economy**

Market is created up-front by the regulator

Uniform rules and no pre-approval of trades

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## A Closer Look at the Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

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- An absolute limit is decided
  - Emitters issued tradable permits = “cap” < previous emissions
  - A fundamentally different “command” to the firm
    - Measure and report emissions and
    - Surrender allowances = emissions
    - No prescribed practice, technology, reduction, etc.
  - Tradability enables market and single price to coordinate efficient abatement actions (equal marginal cost)
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## Three Unique Features

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- Rights to emit must be created and allocated
  - Generally by free allocation (grandfathering)
  - Unique in being explicit and transparent
- Emissions must be measured and reported
  - Radical innovation in environmental regulation
- Maintenance of Registry or Tracking System
  - Analogous to a check-clearing system



## Consequences and Reactions

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Efficient, Decentralized Property Rights System,

**But** “Rights to Pollute”?

Transformed Regulator...Bank-like clerk

**But** Removes Administrative Discretion



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# Some History (1)

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- Early credit-based trading (U.S., late 1970s-1980s)
  - Some cost savings, but generally disappointing
- Leaded-gasoline phase-down (US: 1985-86)
  - 1<sup>st</sup> allowance based program; successful
- Los Angeles RECLAIM Program (1994- )
  - SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub>; local; multi-sector
- US Acid Rain (SO<sub>2</sub>) Program (1995- )
  - Canonical cap-and-trade, very successful
  - National scope, power plants only



## Some History (2)


- OTC/NO<sub>x</sub> Budget Program (1999- )
  - Regional, mostly power plants
- EU ETS (2005 - )
  - First CO<sub>2</sub> and multi-national system
  - Largest cap-and-trade market and program
- Kyoto Protocol (2008 - )
  - Government trading; essentially voluntary
- Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2009 - )
  - 1<sup>st</sup> mandatory US program; very low prices



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
## Why the SO<sub>2</sub> Program was Successful




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## Monitored reduction in wet sulfate deposition due to Acid Rain Program



## CO<sub>2</sub> Prices in the EU ETS



## Lessons from Cap-&-Trade

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- Cost savings are substantial (50%) but not extravagant (95%)
- Environmental effectiveness is better than with command & control
- Simplicity, flexibility, and strict accountability are the key to success
  - No more fuzzy compliance
- Markets have emerged almost effortlessly

## Outline


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# The Allocation Problem

- Cap creates a scarcity rent embodied in allowances. Who should receive it?
- **Prior Use Claims**—incumbent emitters
  - Also, compensation and political uses
- **Public Use Claims**—the government
  - Double dividends and lump sums
- Always recycled. Issue is how & to whom?

# Allowance Value and Abatement Cost



## Two Ways to Distribute Allowances

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- Auctioning: Most recommended
  - Government sells allowances to emitters
- Free allocation: Most used
  - Emitters receive allowances for free
- General agreement on hybrid approach
  - Some initial free allocation
  - Eventual full auctioning



## Cost Implications

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- Straight-forward with auctioning
  - Pay as for any other input into production
- Free allocation raises **opportunity cost** issue
  - Typically fixed and historical; independent of current emissions or production
  - Allowance use incurs an opportunity cost
  - Do emitters recognize opportunity cost?



## “Windfall Profits” and Electric Power Regulation

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- No (private) windfall profits with auctions
  - Added cost recovered like anything else
- Free allocation and liberalized power markets
  - Rate-payers absorb cost; suppliers benefit
- Free allocation and cost-of-service regulation
  - Value of free allocation is not a “cost”
  - Lower electricity rates, but inefficient



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## Summary

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- An efficient, effective, and decentralized way to limit emissions
- Requires market to be “constructed” and emission rights to be distributed
- Allocation of allowance value is contentious
- Interaction with electric power regulation is complicated



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